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Abstract
Background: Increasing demand on emergency healthcare systems has prompted introduction of new healthcare
service models including the provision of GP services in or alongside emergency departments. In England this led
to a policy proposal and £100million (US$130million) of funding for all emergency departments to have co-located
GP services. However, there is a lack of evidence for whether such service models are effective and safe. We
examined diagnostic errors reported in patient safety incident reports to develop theories to explain how and why
they occurred to inform potential priority areas for improvement and inform qualitative data collection at case
study sites to further refine the theories.
Methods: We used a mixed-methods design using exploratory descriptive analysis to identify the most frequent
and harmful sources of diagnostic error and thematic analysis, incorporating realist methodology to refine theories
from an earlier rapid realist review, to describe how and why the events occurred and could be mitigated, to
inform improvement recommendations. We used two UK data sources: Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths
(30.7.13–14.08.18) and National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) patient safety incident reports (03.01.05–
30.11.15).
Results: Nine Coroners’ reports (from 1347 community and hospital reports, 2013–2018) and 217 NRLS reports
(from 13 million, 2005–2015) were identified describing diagnostic error related to GP services in or alongside
emergency departments. Initial theories to describe potential priority areas for improvement included: difficulty
identifying appropriate patients for the GP service; under-investigation and misinterpretation of diagnostic tests;
and inadequate communication and referral pathways between the emergency and GP services. High-risk
presentations included: musculoskeletal injury, chest pain, headache, calf pain and sick children.
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Conclusion: Initial theories include the following topics as potential priority areas for improvement interventions and
evaluation to minimise the risk of diagnostic errors when GPs work in or alongside emergency departments: a standardised
initial assessment with streaming guidance based on local service provision; clinical decision support for high-risk conditions;
and standardised computer systems, communication and referral pathways between emergency and GP services. These
theories require refinement and testing with qualitative data collection from case study (hospital) sites.
Keywords: Patient safety, Diagnostic error, General practitioners, Emergency department
Background
Increasing demand on emergency healthcare systems has
prompted the introduction of new service models, including
provision of General Practitioner (GP) services in or along-
side emergency departments [1]. In England this led to a pol-
icy proposal and £100million (US$130million) of funding for
all emergency departments to have co-located GP services
[2]. The aim of this initiative was to reduce waiting times
and overcrowding and therefore improve overall patient care
and safety [3, 4], however, there is a lack of evidence about
potential patient safety risks associated with these service
models and how these could be mitigated [5, 6].
Estimates for the number of patients presenting to emer-
gency departments with primary care type problems that can
be dealt with by GPs vary from 10 to 43%, depending on def-
initions and population groups [7–13]. There are several dif-
ferent models of GP service provision associated with
emergency departments: INSIDE the emergency department,
either integrated with the emergency medicine service or in a
separate parallel service; or OUTSIDE the emergency de-
partment, either on or off site [14]. These models may func-
tion on a spectrum from being closer to an emergency
medicine service or to usual primary care service provision.
As well as GPs, the service may also include nurse practi-
tioners and other primary care healthcare professionals [14].
Emergency departments are high-risk settings for diag-
nostic errors that may result in significant patient harm
[15, 16]. The World Health Organization has also identi-
fied diagnostic errors in primary care as a high-priority
problem [17]. GPs traditionally have different diagnostic
approaches to emergency medicine clinicians. They rely
less on acute investigations [8, 18], and may have differ-
ent approaches or cognitive biases from working in
lower risk settings [19]. There is little research evidence
to guide decisions about how GP service models in or
alongside emergency departments can be most effective
and safe, and how to minimise the risk of diagnostic er-
rors [5, 6, 20, 21].
Patient safety incident reports can be aggregated to gener-
ate data summaries describing the most frequent and harm-
ful incident types while thematic analysis of individual report
texts can be used to explore how and why such incidents
may occur and identify contributing factors that can be tar-
geted to mitigate future events [22]. Studies of incident re-
ports using this approach have been used to develop
improvement recommendations to prevent safety-related
hospital deaths [23], the treatment of children in primary
care [24], and diagnostic errors in undifferentiated emer-
gency department attendances [25].
This work was part of a wider NIHR funded realist evalu-
ation evaluating the effectiveness of GPs working in or along-
side emergency departments [26], conducted following a
rapid realist review of the effectiveness of GPs working in or
alongside emergency departments [6]. Realist methodology
includes learning from ‘nuggets of information’ to explain
what works, for whom, how and in what circumstances to
generate theories described as context-mechanism-outcome
configurations (CMOs) [27, 28]. We aimed to analyse two
UK data sources of patient safety incident reports to: charac-
terise the nature of diagnostic errors related to these GP ser-
vices; refine theories developed from the rapid realist review
to explain how and why these incidents occurred to inform
qualitative data collection and subsequent theory testing at
hospital case study sites; and inform improvement
recommendations.
Methods
We conducted a four-stage sequential exploratory mixed-
methods analysis of two UK national data sources: Coroners’
reports to prevent future deaths, and patient safety incident
reports from the National Learning and Reporting System
(NRLS). This notably incorporated realist principles as
follows:
1. Familiarisation of report content and
application of codes from the PISA frameworks to
create coded summaries of report narratives [22].
2. Generation of data summaries using exploratory
descriptive statistics to describe the frequency and
burden (harm) of incident types and key
relationships with contributory factors.
3. Interpretation of themes and learning through a
thematic analysis of reports aggregated by common
characteristics from step 2. We used realist
methodology to infer why incidents may have
occurred to identify additional contributing factors
which were not explicit from report narratives read
in isolation. We identified mechanisms (M) that
explained how or why contexts (C) related to
outcomes (O) to develop theories described as
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context-mechanism-outcome configurations
(CMOs), definitions in Table 1 [27, 28].
4. As per realist methodology, an additional stage of
stakeholder expert feedback was added to
validate findings.
Data sources
Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths
According to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Coro-
ners have a statutory duty to make reports to a person,
organisation, local authority, government department or
agency if they believe that action should be taken to pre-
vent future deaths [29]. All reports and responses must
be sent to the Chief Coroner and most cases are sum-
marised and published on the Courts and Tribunals Ju-
diciary publicly available website [30].
National Reporting and learning System (NRLS) patient
safety incident reports
The NRLS is a database of over 18 million patient safety inci-
dent reports, usually reported by staff, from healthcare orga-
nisations in England and Wales. A patient safety incident is
defined as, “any unintended or unexpected incident that
could have harmed or did harm a patient during healthcare
delivery” [31]. Reporting began voluntarily in 2003 but, since
2010, it has been mandatory to report any incident that re-
sulted in severe patient harm or death. Since the inception of
the NRLS, reporting arrangements have included batch
returns via local risk management systems, and more re-
cently in England, by direct notification to the Care Quality
Commission (an independent regulator of all health and so-
cial care services in England). Reports contain anonymised,
structured information about location, patient demographics,
and the reporter’s perception of harm severity, complemen-
ted by unstructured free-text descriptions of the incident, po-
tential contributory factors, and planned actions to prevent
reoccurrence.
Sampling strategy
Pilot work was conducted in January 2017 to identify a
sample of NRLS reports regarding GP services in or
alongside emergency departments, but most were irrele-
vant referring to the GP as part of the patient’s journey
rather than the GP service. Since the sample of identified
Coroners’ reports all described diagnostic error, al-
though infrequent, we included these recognised patient
safety incident data as they record the highest level of
patient harm and may be especially informative.
Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths
We reviewed all reports available in the ‘Community
health care and emergency services related deaths’, ‘Hos-
pital Death’ and ‘Child Death’ categories (2013–2018) on
the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website in August
2018. Reports were selected if they were related to GP
service provision in or alongside emergency departments
(inclusion and exclusion criteria shown in Table 2).
National Reporting and learning System (NRLS) patient
safety incident reports
NRLS reports were available from 03/01/05–30/11/15,
stored on a secure computer platform at Cardiff Univer-
sity. We filtered reports with structured electronic vari-
ables (pre-specified by the reporter or their organisation
before submission to the NRLS) for emergency and urgent
care settings (PD05); then the free-text with primary care
terms to identify reports regarding GP services in these
settings; then using structured variables for diagnostic
error as defined by the reporter (IN05), Fig. 1. Searches
were conducted July–September 2018. After this three-
stage filtering process, we read the reports to determine if
they were related to GP service provision in or alongside
emergency departments (Table 2).
Data analysis
Familiarisation and data coding
We coded reports from both datasets using the multi-
axial PISA classification system based on the recursive
model for incident analysis and aligned to the four major
classes of information advocated by the World Health Or-
ganisation International Classification for Patient Safety
[22]. This involved reading the free text component of
Table 1 Realist definitions [27, 28]
Realist definitions
Context (C) Pre-existing conditions which influence the success or
failure of different interventions or programmes
Mechanism
(M)
Characteristics of the intervention and people’s reaction
to it; how it influences their reasoning
Outcome (O) Intended and unintended results of the intervention as
a result of a mechanism operating within a context
Initial rough
theory
An early theory, informed by available evidence, about
how, why, for whom, and in what circumstances the
intervention is thought to work described as a context-
mechanism-outcome (CMO) configuration
Refined theory An initial theory that has been refined using primary or
secondary evidence
Table 2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria
• Reports describing diagnostic errors related to GP services in or
alongside emergency departments
Exclusion criteria
• Reports involving community ‘in-hours’ or ‘out-of-hours’ GP service
provision not occurring at the same geographical location either
within or alongside emergency departments
• Diagnostic errors occurring during usual emergency department
service provision
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each report and coding information in relation to: the
primary safety incident that was reported to have directly
affected patient care (e.g. diagnostic error); the chain of in-
cidents leading up to the safety incident (e.g. misinterpret-
ation of X Ray); other independent contributory factors
(e.g. unusual patient presentation); and reported patient
harm outcomes with harm severity classified from the free
text report according to WHO International Classification
for Patient Safety definitions [32]. We classified diagnostic
errors according to the Society to Improve Diagnosis in
Medicine (Table 3) [33]. The primary coder was an expe-
rienced GP and patient safety qualitative researcher (AC).
A medical student (FH) double coded the NRLS reports
(259/1878, 14%) and took part in coding meetings to clar-
ify the recursive model approach, the nature of the codes
and discuss complex cases. FH was working on a parallel
study analysing NRLS reports describing diagnostic error
associated with usual emergency department care [25].
The Cohen’s kappa showed acceptable moderate agree-
ment (0.51) between coders.
Generation of data summaries
We exported the codes into Microsoft Excel for mac
(version 16.35) and used pivot tables to undertake an
exploratory descriptive analysis to assess the nature of
the diagnostic error and the most frequent and harm-
ful presenting conditions from both datasets, the as-
sociated chain of incidents, and other contributory
factors. We summarised the most commonly identi-
fied causes and potential interventions in a driver dia-
gram [34]. This is a quality improvement tool to
summarise priority areas for change and to map po-
tential interventions.
Fig. 1 National Reporting and Learning System patient safety incident reports, search strategy and results
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Thematic analysis and realist theory development
We then used thematic analysis to identify and describe
recurring themes within and between datasets (not cap-
tured by the quantitative data) that could be targeted to
mitigate future similar incidents, incorporating realist
methodology to infer why incidents may have occurred,
to whom, in what circumstances and why. We used the
initial rough theories developed from the rapid realist re-
view as a template for mapping supporting data on the
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet [6]. If the data gave add-
itional information to explain how and why the event
may have occurred, we incorporated this information
into the CMO configuration to refine the theory. New
information, not included in the initial rough theories
from the review, was used to develop new initial
theories.
Stakeholder feedback
We presented findings to the wider ‘GPs in EDs’ team
for feedback: including patient safety experts, patient
representatives, primary care and emergency department
clinicians (TH, PH, ACS, FD, ME, PA, JH, BE) at a study
meeting in November 2018. Feedback was strongly sup-
portive. We also carried out literature searches to deter-
mine whether existing interventions or initiatives for
promoting patient safety had been described in each area
and aligned these with the driver diagram intervention
areas. When available, the strength of each intervention
was graded using the US Department of Veterans Affairs
classification, where the strongest designs are permanent
and physical rather than temporary and procedural [35].
Results
Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths
We screened 1347 Coroners’ reports to prevent future
deaths classified as “Community health care and emer-
gency services” and “Hospital deaths” over the five-year
period. From these we identified nine cases which in-
cluded diagnostic errors related to GP service provision
in or alongside emergency departments (summarised in
Table 4). No new cases were identified in the “Child
Death” category (with some duplication of cases found
in the other sections).
Seven of these reports described a wrong diagnosis
with a lack of referral for investigation on initial presen-
tation. Three main conditions were identified: veno-
thrombotic events presenting with calf pain or shortness
of breath (n = 3); cardiac death with a presentation of
chest pain (n = 2); and intracranial haemorrhage follow-
ing a head injury (n = 2). Another report described de-
layed initial assessment and diagnosis for a patient,
which was felt to have contributed towards his death by
sepsis. A further report described a missed diagnosis
where a lack of communication about recurrent atten-
dances from a walk-in centre was thought to have con-
tributed to the death of a baby with pneumonia.
Root cause analysis and expert opinions were often de-
tailed in the reports, giving understanding of the factors
that may have contributed to the diagnostic errors. Patient
characteristics included those presenting with rare condi-
tions, for example Loeys-Dietz syndrome (thoracic aortic
aneurysm), or others presenting with an atypical pattern
of signs and symptoms, including no leg swelling in a pa-
tient presenting with a deep vein thrombosis or a young
female with chest pain. The possibility of cognitive biases
affecting the clinical reasoning of GPs who may usually
work in community settings, with a lower probability of
serious disease, was raised in one expert opinion. Organ-
isational factors that may have contributed towards diag-
nostic errors included: lack of clear streaming guidance
for patients presenting with high-risk conditions; unclear
referral pathways for patients sent in for further investiga-
tion by their local GP; and communication barriers be-
tween primary and secondary care.
National Reporting and learning System reports
Over the ten-year period, 1878 reports were identified in
the filtered sample and screened. Irrelevant and dupli-
cate reports were excluded resulting in an included sam-
ple of 217 reports describing diagnostic errors with
learning related to GP service provision in or alongside
emergency departments (see Fig. 1).
The reports were generally brief, with limited infor-
mation about contributory events, and most did not
describe the patient harm outcome resulting from the
diagnostic errors (n = 188). In those reports where
harm could be ascertained, 11 reports described mild
or moderate patient harm, 12 described severe harm
and six described events leading to death. Three of
the six reports describing a death involved patients
presenting with headaches. From the nature of the
serious diagnoses involved (Table 5), for those reports
without harm descriptions, patient harm appears
likely.




The failure to (a) establish an accurate and timely
explanation of the patient’s health problem(s) or (b)
communicate that explanation to the patient.
Wrong
diagnosis
Occurs, for example, if a patient truly having a heart




The diagnosis should have been made earlier.
Missed
diagnosis
Medical complaints never explained, or more specific
complaints never accurately diagnosed.
Cooper et al. BMC Emergency Medicine          (2021) 21:139 Page 5 of 13
Table 4 Summary of Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths related to GP service provision in or alongside emergency departments

















A 47-year-old woman presented to the ur-
gent care centre with calf pain. She had a
strong family history of DVT but this was not
elicited in the history and she was diagnosed
with muscular pain. She later died from a pul-
monary embolism.
“The A&E expert gave evidence that patients
presenting to an urgent care centre, walk in
centre or out of hours are a much higher risk
group than those who present to their own
GP surgery. As a consequence, there must be
clinically agreed protocols that at the front
end of any facility that receives undifferentiated
patients that manage this higher risk
population. Patients that present with certain
high risk conditions such as chest pain,
shortness of breath or calf pain must be
directed to a facility that can exclude









A man presented to a walk in centre with calf
pain following a driving holiday in France.
There was no calf swelling or tenderness and
he was diagnosed with a musculoskeletal
injury. He was then seen by his own GP a
further 3 times but the walk in centre records
were not available. He later died of a
pulmonary embolism.
“Records of the August appointment (to the










A 44-year-old man presented to A&E and was
streamed to the GP. He died from a pulmon-
ary embolism two days later.
“Mr (), died of a pulmonary embolism having
been diverted from accident and emergency
assessment 2 days prior to his death. This
meant that further tests, which could have
led to an earlier diagnosis for his condition
were not done. No 111 referral information










A 30-year-old woman presented to the ambu-
lance service with chest pain, normal examin-
ation and ECG. She chose to see her GP who
thought the pain was non-cardiac, she died a
few hours later at home.
“Mrs Y, aged 30 with a family history of heart
disease, was seen by ambulance staff with chest
pain, and examination and ECG were reported
as normal. The GP had not considered the








A 42-year-old woman with chest pain was
seen by an ambulance, had a normal ECG
and chose to see her GP for review. She was
seen by the local GP and referred to A&E for
further investigation. She was streamed to the
GP in A&E who referred her back to A&E
where she was assessed, treated for gastritis
and discharged with no further investigations.
The patient’s presenting history of the same
pain as her previous aortic dissection and the
initial GP referring letter was lost in transfer.
She died a few days later.
“Crucially, the only piece of the patient’s
presenting history which wasn’t passed on
(to the ED doctor from the local GP) was
that the pain that she was feeling was the
same pain which she had felt back in 2011
when she suffered her previous aortic
dissection. Had he been aware of this piece of
information, his evidence was that he would







A man presented to an urgent care centre
following a head injury and again the
following day with headache and vomiting.
No CT was done. He collapsed and died the
next day.
“Patients undergoing haemodialysis or
significant uraemia are at risk of
haemorrhage and this is not commonly
known within the medical profession or referred







A 10-year-old boy presented to A&E following
a head injury and was streamed to the urgent
GP clinic and discharged. He was seen at
home by a paramedic the following day and
not brought to hospital. He collapsed the
next day whilst waiting to be seen in the GP
surgery. He underwent neurosurgery but died
a few days later.
“The consultant from the department told me,
during the course of his evidence, that it would
be good practice for all suspected head
injuries to be referred to the A&E team.”
8. Unclear n/a Sepsis A patient presented to the emergency “Staffing levels in the emergency
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Most reports described patients leaving the emergency
department with a wrong diagnosis (n = 144). These
were largely due to errors in clinical decision-making:
mis-interpretation of X-Rays later picked up by radio-
logical reporting systems (n = 87), or under-investigation
of key symptoms (n = 59). Other reports described a
delayed diagnosis within the emergency department or
which was identified at a later date (n = 71). Over half of
these involved an inadequate triage or streaming process
(n = 42). Others described inadequate specialist referral
pathways from community or emergency department
GP services (n = 21), or inadequate assessment and
Table 4 Summary of Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths related to GP service provision in or alongside emergency departments









Summary of report Key learning from reports
Delayed
diagnosis
department and was booked into the urgent
care centre. He was not triaged for over 45
min by which time his condition had
deteriorated.
department were not sufficient to be able to






Pneumonia A 9-month-old baby presented to a walk-in
centre 3 times over 3 months with a cough.
She was then seen twice by nurse practi-
tioners at her own surgery with the same
complaint who could not recall having access
to information about the walk in centre visits
and did not refer the patient to the GP. She
died the following month from
bronchopneumonia.
“There appeared to be no guidelines or
triggers for when a practice nurse
(practitioner) should refer a patient be seen
by a doctor.”
Table 5 Presenting conditions involved in diagnostic errors described in incident reports related to GP service provision in or
alongside emergency departments (National Reporting and Learning System reports; 217/13million 2005–2015)
Presenting complaint Number of NRLS reports Examples of conditions involved
(not always stated in the report)
Musculoskeletal injury 114 114 fractures
7 Hip and 6 Spinal fractures
Chest pain 18 15 Acute Coronary Syndrome
Unwell child 15 7 sick infants requiring resuscitation level care
Headache 14 6 Head injury
5 Subarachnoid haemorrhage
2 Brain tumour
Abdominal pain 9 3 Appendicitis
1 Ischaemic bowel




Limb pain – no trauma 4 2 Deep vein thrombosis
1 Ischaemic foot
Collapse 4 1 Cardiac arrest
Back pain 4 1 Pulmonary embolism
1 Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm
1 Spinal cord compression
Limb weakness 2 2 Stroke
Eye injury 2 1 Missed foreign body in eye
Rash 2 1 Measles
Other 13 1 Testicular torsion
1 Ectopic pregnancy
1 Anaphylaxis
Not documented 10 1 Pneumothorax
1 Trauma case
Total 217
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investigation. In this sample there were no reports of
missed diagnoses (Society to Improve Diagnosis in
Medicine definition, Table 2) [33].
Initial theories developed from both data sources
We grouped contributory events that led to the diagnos-
tic errors into three themes: difficulty with triage and
streaming processes; errors in clinical decision-making in-
cluding under-investigation and mis-interpretation of re-
sults; and organisational factors including inadequate
referral pathways and communication between services.
These are summarised in the driver diagram, along with
interventions that could mitigate future events (see Fig. 2).
Theories refined and developed from these data are de-
scribed as context-mechanism-outcome configurations.
Difficulty with triage and streaming processes
If patients presenting to the emergency department (C)
are assessed for streaming but the streaming nurse is unclear which
patients are appropriate (due to unclear guidance or inexperience)
(M)
or the initial assessment is inadequate (limited history or lack of
basic physiological observations) (M)
then higher risk patients may be streamed to the GP service (O)
*Bold text indicates how this theory was refined from the initial theory in the
rapid realist review [6]
One Coroner’s preventing future death report and 29
NRLS reports highlighted the difficulty in identifying
which patients were appropriate for the GP service.
These included 10 patients presenting with chest pain
and seven unwell children. A delay in the initial assess-
ment for those streamed to the GP service (n = 14), inad-
equate assessment including basic observations (n = 13),
and a lack of understanding of which patients were ap-
propriate for the GP service (n = 7) were all described as
contributing to events.
“A [>65 year old man] presented at [time] with diz-
ziness and feeling like he was going to collapse. No
vital signs recorded by GP streamer. Waited 1
hour to be seen in urgent care centre - when
assessed by nurse practitioner heart rate 24 and BP
unrecordable. Transferred to resus.”
Errors in clinical decision-making
If patients present to the emergency department with a condition not
usually dealt with in primary care (C)
and are seen by a GP who may have inadequate knowledge or skillset
for the condition (M)
the patient may be at risk of a mis-management (O)
*This was a new theory generated from these data
Clinicians’ cognitive biases and the effect of working in
a potentially higher risk environment on diagnostic
thinking patterns were not documented. Six Coroners’
preventing future death reports and 59 NRLS reports
Fig. 2 Driver diagram to show key areas to reduce the risk of diagnostic errors when GP services are located in or alongside emergency departments
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described a lack of referral for urgent investigation. The
conditions involved included: 27 fractures (four spinal
and three hip fractures), 10 patients presenting with a
headache (four following a head injury, four with con-
firmed subarachnoid haemorrhage), five patients with a
deep vein thrombosis, four patients with acute coronary
syndrome and four unwell infants.
Some NRLS reports described GPs taking on emer-
gency clinician roles, interpreting acute investigations
and managing patients with conditions not usually
dealt with in community general practice. Most of
these incidents were identified by radiological report-
ing systems, diagnosing fractures at a later date (n =
87). Others highlighted a lack of knowledge of child
safeguarding protocols (n = 5) or the clinician’s inad-
equate skillset.
“Patient attended the A&E department, however
seen by the GP placed in the department who ex-
amined the patient, ordered an x-ray and then ap-
plied a plaster and discharged the patient to
fracture clinic. On reviewing the fracture, it was
found to be a comminuted fracture of the radial
head. This type of fracture would have necessitated
an orthopaedic review as they benefit from early
surgery. On reviewing the clinical notes no mention
of an orthopaedic review was mentioned. It seems
that the practitioner concerned does not have the
necessary experience to evaluate this type of in-
jury (this is not a primary care type of patient) and
should not have managed the patient in the first
place.”
Inadequate referral pathways and communication
between services
If there is poor communication between the GP service and the
emergency department service (C)
because of a lack of awareness about capacity (M)
a lack of awareness that investigations have already been
requested (M)
or inadequate referral pathways (M)
then patient assessment and treatment may be delayed (O)
*Bold text indicates how this theory was refined from the initial theory in the
rapid realist review [6]
Inadequate specialist referral pathways, from the com-
munity or emergency department GP services, were de-
scribed to contribute towards diagnostic errors in one
Coroner’s preventing future death and 21 NRLS reports.
Miscommunication between services about capacity and
incompatible computer systems between the emergency
department and GP service causing patients to get ‘lost’
in the system, in some cases leading to delays in treat-
ment were described in another five NRLS reports.
Under-staffing was described to contribute towards de-
layed assessment and diagnosis in one Coroner’s and
one NRLS report. Another Coroner’s report highlighted
a case where a lack of communication with community
primary care regarding attendances to a walk-in centre
possibly contributed towards the death of a baby.
“An infant [<2 years] seen by primary care doctor,
discharged from PCC at [time 1] and sent back to
A&E. Identified by primary care doctor in letter as
unwell, laboured breathing and requiring further as-
sessment and treatment however not referred to
paediatricians or informed A&E. As a result the
child was not seen until [time 2 – approximately 2.5
hours later] at which point was unwell requiring
admission to resus.”
Driver diagram
Our findings are mapped onto a driver diagram which
shows the three main sources of unsafe care as the pri-
ority areas for change identified from these reports and
potential improvement interventions (‘change ideas’)
that would be suitable for evaluation (Fig. 2).
Discussion
Principal findings
Nine Coroners’ reports (from 1347 community and hos-
pital reports, 2013–2018) and 217 NRLS reports (from
13 million, 2005–2015) were identified describing diag-
nostic errors with learning relevant to GP service
provision in or alongside emergency departments. Initial
theories include the following topics as potential priority
areas for improvement interventions: inadequate triage
and streaming processes; errors in clinical decision-
making (under-investigation and mis-interpretation of
results); and poor communication and referral pathways
between the services. High risk presentations included
musculoskeletal injury, chest pain, headache, calf pain
and sick children.
Strengths and limitations
There are recognised limitations in analysing these data.
Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths only cover
the most severe of cases that have led to a patient death
so the lessons derived from these cases may not be gen-
eralisable to cases with harm but not death outcomes.
Analysis of NRLS patient safety incident reports is also
limited by under-reporting, selection bias and incom-
plete analysis of causation [22, 36]. However, patient
safety incident reports are recognised by the World
Health Organization as useful to analyse the frequency
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of particular sources of harm, describe the nature of in-
cident type and enable causes of harm and potential
risks to be explored, supporting this mixed methods ap-
proach. Findings can then be used to inform local data
collection and quality improvement projects to measure
and monitor safe patient care in these settings [37, 38].
Diagnostic errors related to these service models may
have been reported through other healthcare providers
and therefore not identified through our NRLS filtering
process. At the time of this study, NRLS reports were
available up to 2015, updated searches may have identi-
fied further incident reports, potentially with additional
themes indicating areas for improvement. GPs are recog-
nised as low patient safety incident reporters, which may
also have contributed to the low number of reports iden-
tified [22]. We have not included reports describing
diagnostic errors occurring in usual emergency depart-
ment care - whether GPs make relatively fewer or more
errors on the same patients than emergency department
staff doctors is unknown. The Cohen’s kappa statistic in-
dicates that inter-rater reliability was moderate however
this was strengthened by researcher one being an experi-
enced GP and patient safety and qualitative researcher.
Stakeholder feedback also strongly supported findings.
However, a strength is that many of the Coroners’ re-
ports contained learning from in-depth root cause ana-
lysis, and which could be applied to near misses described
in the NRLS reports. These two different lenses comple-
ment each other for understanding unsafe care, in terms
of what happened and perceived causes for both the most
serious and other incidents with a range of severity out-
comes. Our small sample size is a limitation to the
generalizability of our findings but the realist evaluation
approach aims to build theory rather than provide defini-
tive answers. Incorporating a realist approach into the the-
matic analysis of these data, we believe is novel. It
structured the process of raising hypotheses to infer how
and why these incidents occurred, and look for demi-
regularities (patterns) to give greater understanding of
possible causation. The theories can then be taken forward
and tested against qualitative data collected/generated at
case study sites with the aim of producing useful,
insightful, actionable findings. These insights may also be
applied to other new healthcare services where different
healthcare providers take on additional roles. Systematic
reviews may have identified further interventions to miti-
gate such events.
Comparison with existing literature
Other studies support our findings that the causes of
diagnostic errors in emergency departments are multi-
faceted, often with several contributory factors and
have potential to result in serious patient harm [16,
39]. The Royal College of Emergency Medicine
identified abdominal pain in the elderly, aortic dissec-
tion and cervical spine or hip fractures as the top
three most common incident reports in emergency
medicine following analysis of 61,449 incident reports
in 2015 [40]. Our other work involved analysis of
2288 NRLS reports over a two year period (2013–
2015) and described fracture (notably cervical spine
and hip fractures), myocardial infarction and intracra-
nial bleed as the most common diagnostic errors [25].
High-risk conditions for diagnostic errors described in
community general practice do not include musculo-
skeletal injuries, headaches or veno-thrombotic events,
[41] which may reflect the different cohort of patients
(and ‘pre-test’ levels of risk) seen in these settings.
There is little national guidance on which patients
should be streamed to GP services and this will depend on
local service provision [42]. Initial NHS England guidance
has adopted a model which advises against streaming pa-
tients with traumatic or head injuries and includes specific
guidance for those presenting with chest pain, nosebleeds
and feverish children [43]. There are however, established
and internationally recognised triage systems which can
help identify seriously ill patients who require urgent med-
ical attention [44, 45]. Early warning scores for unwell
children are available, [46] with more recent tools incorp-
orating clinician ‘gut instinct’ and use by GPs [47]. The
‘Gestalt’ decision-making of senior nursing staff may also
be better than algorithmic methods [48]. Our findings
suggest that all patients who present to emergency depart-
ments, for the emergency or GP service, should be subject
to a prompt standardised initial assessment, including
basic observations.
The evidence for validated clinical decision-making
tools in this setting is limited. Recognised tools to as-
sess low risk chest pain include ECG and biochemical
investigation results that may not be available to GPs
working in emergency departments [49, 50] There are
no validated risk assessment tools to assess patients
presenting to the emergency department with head-
ache, and the difficulty in identifying the few that do
have a subarachnoid haemorrhage is acknowledged
[51, 52]. Diagnostic cognitive processes and the effects
of simplifying rules, short cuts or heuristics to replace
more complex procedures are well described [53].
GPs that usually work in a lower risk community set-
ting where there are often lower perceived and actual
pre-test probabilities of serious disease may be at risk
of errors in risk estimation. Cognitive debiasing strat-
egies, [54] and reflective practice, [55] have been tried
but their effectiveness in practice is questionable [56].
Poor communication and inadequate referral path-
ways between GP and specialist care are known to
contribute towards patient safety incidents and can
be targeted on a local level. Child safeguarding
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referral processes should be standardised between
GP and emergency services [57]. Integrated com-
puter systems including timely mandatory forcing
functions for key information can improve commu-
nication [58, 59].
The lack of patient safety research in this area should be
highlighted, [6, 20, 21] and teams should continue to learn
from diagnostic errors, near misses and other patient safety
incidents through local and national level reporting systems
[60, 61].
Implications for research and/or practice
Service providers and individual emergency departments
will adopt a GP service model depending on their local
circumstances and context [14]. Since this work was
conducted, urgent and emergency care services along
with almost all NHS service provision have changed due
to the Covid-19 pandemic, including telephone screen-
ing of emergency department walk-in attendances, [62]
and remote GP consultations [63]. Recommendations to
improve future practice summarised in the driver dia-
gram could however still be applied to these evolving
healthcare service models. Implementation of the new
Emergency Care Dataset (ECDS) in England, with the in-
tent to extend soon into Ambulance and Integrated Ur-
gent Care will ensure that in future there will be
improved quantitative data to identify both presenting
conditions and outcomes in patients who access Urgent
and Emergency Care services to improve understanding
of diagnostic errors in these settings. With better such
data, the necessary evaluations of improvement interven-
tions will be more feasible. These theories require refine-
ment and testing with qualitative data collection from
case study (hospital) sites.
Conclusion
Initial theories include the following topics as potential
priority areas for improvement interventions and evalu-
ation to minimise the risk of diagnostic errors when GPs
work in or alongside emergency departments: a standar-
dised initial assessment with streaming guidance based
on local service provision; clinical decision support for
high-risk conditions; and standardised computer sys-
tems, communication and referral pathways between
emergency and GP services.
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